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THE DOUBLE DOCTRINE AGENT:
STREAMLINING THE RESTATEMENT THIRD
OF AGENCY BY ELIMINATING THE
APPARENT AGENCY DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
[W]hatever a man sui juris may do of himself, he may do by
another; and as a correlative of the maxim, that what is done
by another is to be deemed done by the party himself. “Qui
facit per alium, per seipsum facere videtur.”1
Although the law of agency is relatively new compared to other
areas of law, agency law is the foundation upon which many forms of
business organizations are built.2 Agency provides the starting point for
many of the laws governing partnerships and corporations.3
Furthermore, agency law continues to grow in prominence as laws
governing relatively new entities, such as limited liability companies,
expand and existing business entities seek to maximize efficiency
through cooperation.4 An understanding of agency law “is of great
assistance, if not prerequisite, to an understanding of the laws of
partnership and corporations” because in “no other field of law is the
close interrelation of business practice and the rules of law more
apparent.”5
In a world of growing conglomerates and entities in search of
“synergies,” it will become increasingly difficult to determine who has
the ability to affect an organization’s legal relationships and how those
relationships can be affected. Agency law answers these questions.
Some relationships are straight forward—the product of clear and direct
communication by a principal to an agent regarding what and how a

1
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 2, at 2 (Little, Brown, and
Company 1882).
2
FRANCIS B. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT § 3, at 5 (West
Publishing Co. 1924).
3
Id.; see also Glenn G. Morris, Personal Liability for Corporate Participants Without
Corporate Veil-Piercing: Louisiana Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 207, 261 (1993) (discussing how
corporate law derived the concept of non-liability from principals of agency law); cf. Mary
Szto, Limited Liability Company Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context, 23 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 61, 98 (2004) (“agency, partnership, and corporate law, [are] the immediate forbears
of the LLC”).
4
TIFFANY, supra note 2, at 5-6.
5
Id.
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task should be done.6 Of greater concern, however, are the individuals
who have the ability to affect an organization’s legal relationships
despite the fact that neither agency nor agreed authority exists.7 It is in
these situations that business entities run the greatest risk of being
caught unprepared for the consequences of actions taken by individuals
unauthorized by the entities themselves. Further adding to the problem,
courts’ application of the doctrines of apparent authority, apparent
agency, and agency by estoppel are inconsistent and confusing, at best.8
Such powerful doctrines must be carefully drafted and tailored to ensure
that they accomplish their respective goals without unduly interfering
with business’ unending drive for economic efficiency. With that end in
mind, this Note streamlines the law of agency by combining the
doctrines of agency by estoppel and apparent agency in order to
promote both economic and judicial efficiency.9
Part II of this Note focuses on state courts’ treatment of agency law,
in addition to treatments by the Restatement Second of Agency
(“Restatement Second”) and the Restatement Third of Agency
(“Restatement Third”).10 Specifically, Part II examines how each of the
Restatements and courts establish an agency relationship between
parties and create authority for the agent to act.11 Part III of this Note
analyzes courts’ applications of the doctrines of apparent agency and
agency by estoppel under the Restatement Second and Restatement Third,
differentiating each.12 Further, Part III discusses the differences between
apparent agency and agency by estoppel, weighing the benefits of both
doctrines within agency law.13 Finally, Part IV proposes to eliminate the
doctrine of apparent agency from the Restatement Third and redraft
section 2.05 outlining the use of agency by estoppel.14

6
See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1 (discussing the creation of actual agency and actual
authority).
7
See infra Parts II.A.2., II.B.2., II.C.1 (discussing the requirements for apparent agency,
apparent authority, and estoppel).
8
See infra notes 37, 106, 129 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ incorrect
characterization of the doctrines of perceived agency, agency by estoppel, and apparent
authority as interchangeable and essentially the same doctrines).
9
See infra Part IV (proposing revision of the Restatement Third to eliminate perceived
agency and expand agency by estoppel).
10
See infra Part II (explaining the requirements for actual agency, apparent agency,
actual authority, apparent authority, incidental authority, inherent authority, and
estoppel).
11
See infra Part II.
12
See infra Part III.
13
See infra Part III.
14
See infra Part IV.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF AGENCY THEORY
In order to understand how to apply the doctrines contained in the
Restatement Third,15 one must fully understand how the doctrines were
stated in the Restatement Second and interpreted through case law. It is
also important to examine how the Restatement Third has changed the
language of the Restatement Second, thereby altering the doctrines. To
this end, the following section surveys the major doctrines of agency law
in light of contributions from the Restatements and federal and state case
law.16 First, Part II.A examines how two entities can form an agency
relationship and when a principal may be liable even when there is only
a perception of agency.17 Part II.B discusses the concept of authority,
demonstrating how different types of authority are created by the acts of
a principal and the implications of each for the parties.18 Finally, Part
II.C examines the doctrine of estoppel, which a third party may use to
bind someone in the absence of either agency or authority.19
A. Establishing an Agency Relationship
The first step in determining if a principal is liable for the acts of
another under agency law is to establish whether an agency relationship
exists between the two parties. Part II.A.1 examines the requirements for
creating actual agency.20 Part II.A.2 studies how courts have used the
doctrine of apparent agency, embodied in section 267 of the Restatement
Second, to disperse liability in the absence of actual agency.21
1.

Actual Agency

Agency is a legal concept which requires the existence of specific
elements; therefore, mere intention to create an agency relationship is
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02 cmt. a (2006). The Restatement (Third) of
Agency was published in July 2006 by the American Law Institute.
16
See infra Part II.
17
See infra Part II.A (examining the creation of both an actual agency relationship or, in
the absence of actual agency, the creation of perceived agency under both the Second and
Third Restatements of Agency).
18
See infra Part II.B (examining how the four types of authority: actual, apparent,
incidental, and inherent, are created and applied by the Restatement Second and Restatement
Third).
19
See infra Part II.C (examining how estoppel is used under the Restatement Second and
predicting how it may be applied under the Restatement Third).
20
See infra Part II.A.1 (describing how actual agency is created).
21
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the requirements for holding a principal liable under
section 267 of the Restatement Second and noting changes in the language in the Restatement
Third).
15
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irrelevant if the elements of agency are absent.22 While a court may
consider what titles parties give to their relationships, principals cannot
escape liability for the acts of a person that fulfills the requirements of
agency by simply classifying them by a different title.23
Actual agency requires a “manifestation of consent by one person to
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control,
and consent by the other so to act.”24 In other words, there are three
requirements for an agency relationship.25 The first requirement is a
manifestation of consent by the “principal” to allow the “agent” to act on
the principal’s behalf.26 While the Restatement Second does not provide a
definition for “manifestation,” the Restatement Third specifically

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. b (1958) (“The relation which the law calls
agency does not depend upon the intent of the parties to create it, nor their belief that they
have done so.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02 cmt. a (2006). Section 1.02,
comment a, states, “[w]hether a relationship is one of agency is a legal conclusion made
after an assessment of the facts of the relationship and the application of the law of agency
to those facts.” Id.; see also WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 3D at
4 (West Publishing Co. 1964).
23
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02 cmt. b (2006). Comment b, titled “Judicial
acceptance or rejection of parties’ characterization,” states: “It is appropriate for the court to
consider whether the parties’ characterization serves a function other than circumventing
an otherwise-applicable statute, regulation, or rule of law, or invoking a statute, regulation,
or rule of law to limit or prevent liability.” Id.
24
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 1.01; EEOC v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 6 F. Supp. 2d 784, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (relying on the
Restatement Second § 1 and holding that the determination of an agency relationship is a
legal one that requires manifestation of consent by the principal to allow an agent to act on
his behalf and subject to his control and consent to so act by the agent); Robert W. Hillman,
Power Shared and Power Denied: A Look at Participatory Rights in the Management of General
Partnerships, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 865, 879 (1984) (discussing how an agency relationship is
hierarchical with the agent being submissive to the principal).
25
EEOC, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 788. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (stating
“[a]gency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a “principal”) manifests
assent to another person (an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to
act.”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (stating “(1) Agency is the fiduciary
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.
(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal. (3) The one who is to act is the
agent.”).
26
Kirkpatrick v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 473 N.E.2d 173, 176-77 (Mass. 1985) (quoting
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 that “[a]n agency ‘results from the
manifestations of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control’” and holding that it is a decision for the jury whether an employer
acts as an insurance company’s agent when the employer takes care of administration of a
group health plan).
22
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illustrates that a “person manifests assent or intention through written or
spoken words or other conduct.”27
Second, in order for an agency relationship to exist, the “agent” must
consent to act on behalf of the “principal.”28 Although both parties must
consent to the relationship, consent is not required to be stated in a
contract or other legal writing.29 In some cases, an agency relationship is
established by examining the relationship of the parties and implying an
agency relationship although no written agreement classifies the
relationship as an agency.30
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 1.03 cmt. b. Comment b describes the concept of manifestation generally as:
A manifestation is conduct by a person, observable by others, that
expresses meaning. It is a broader concept than communication. The
relevant state of mind is that of the person who observes or otherwise
learns of the manifestation. . . . Conduct often incorporates more than
one manifestation, made to different people and carrying different
legal consequences.
The relevant audience for a manifestation
depends on the consequence that the manifestation is alleged to
carry. . . . Expressive conduct is not limited to spoken or written
words, although it often takes those forms. Silence may constitute a
manifestation when, in light of all the circumstances, a reasonable
person would express dissent to the inference that other persons will
draw from silence. Failure then to express dissent will be taken as a
manifestation of affirmance.
Id.
28
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01
(stating in pertinent part that “the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act”).
29
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. b (asserting that in order to have the
relationship there must be an agreement but it is not required to be in the form of a
contract); SEAVEY, supra note 22, § 3A at 3-4. Section 3A of the treatise articulates the point,
stating “[a]lthough agency is intrinsically consensual, it is not necessarily contractual.
Consideration is not essential; one acting for another at the other’s direction is an agent
although he receives nothing for so acting.” SEAVEY, supra note 22, § 3A at 4.
30
See generally A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981). In
Cargill, several local farmers sued Cargill for debts owed to them by the Warren Grain and
Seed Company (Warren). Id. at 288. The farmers asserted that Cargill was Warren’s
principal and, therefore, was liable for Warren’s debt. Id. Cargill agreed to extend Warren,
a grain elevator company a $175,000 line of credit. Id. In exchange for the line of credit,
Warren named Cargill its grain agent and agreed to give Cargill a right of first refusal to
buy all grain sold by Warren. Id. After several years the line of credit was increased to
$300,000 dollars, incorporating the first contract and its requirements. Cargill became more
and more involved in Warren’s day to day operations. Id. at 289. The second contract
required Warren to get permission from Cargill before it made any capital improvements
worth more than $5,000, declared a dividend, or purchased and sold stock. Id. Further,
shortly after the contract was executed, Cargill sent several officials to Warren’s offices to
examine the annual statements, accounts receivable, expenses, inventory, seed, machinery,
and other financial matters. Id. The officials also told Warren that they would be reminded
to make improvements recommended by Cargill. Id. Eventually Cargill sent a regional
27
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The third requirement to establish an agency relationship is that the
“principal” must possess a right of control over the “agent.”31 Although
the “principal” does not need to actually exercise control over the
“agent,” the principal simply needs to have the right to exercise control.32
manager to oversee the Warren operation. Id. Despite Cargill’s efforts, Warren was forced
to shutdown. Id. After Warren closed operations it was found to be in debt to Cargill in
the amount of $3.6 million and in debt to local farmers in the amount of $2 million. Id. at
290. The court held that Cargill was Warren’s principal and was therefore liable for the
debt owed to the farmers, reasoning that Cargill manifested consent by directing Warren to
execute its directives. Id. at 291.
31
Cleveland v. Caplaw Enter., 448 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2006). In Caplaw, two AfricanAmerican males (the tenants) filed suit against the owner of an apartment building for
discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 520. The tenants decided to rent
an apartment shown to them by Heather Stauber an employee of LC Properties of
Rochester LLC (LC). Id. LC managed the building which was owned by Mr. Caplaw. Id.
After providing money towards the security deposit and signing a lease, the tenants
prepared to move into the apartment. Id. However, when the tenants called to determine
when they could pick up the keys to the new place another employee of LC, Lou Thyroff,
said they would need to put down a bigger deposit and expressed uneasiness over whether
the tenants would fit-into in the building, living above a “professional” that would not
appreciate unruly college students. Id. Suspecting discrimination, the tenants contacted a
housing agency which contacted LC on their behalf and discovered that the apartment had
already been rented to another individual. Id. Later, when the tenants went to LC’s office
to get their security deposit, Stauber told them that the “professional” tenant had
complained about the apartment being shown to “black hoodlums.” Id. The tenants filed
suit against LC and, later, against Caplaw as the owner of the building alleging that
Caplaw was liable as LC’s principal under agency theory. Id. at 521. The court reversed
the defendant’s summary judgment motion and held that Caplaw could be found to be
LC’s principal and as such could be held liable for the acts of LC. Id. at 522. The court
reasoned that the only issue disputed as to the agency relationship was right of control.
Although Caplaw had not exercised his control, he still had the right to control. Agency
law only requires a right of control, not the exercise of it. Id.
Similarly in Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., the Oregon Court of appeals held that where a
franchisor exercises control over a franchisee an agency relationship exists. Miller v.
McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
In Miller, a company called 3K Restaurant (3K) owned a McDonald’s restaurant. Id.
3K was allowed to operate the restaurant under a licensing agreement with the
McDonald’s Corp. Id. The licensing agreement was very detailed and mandated that 3K
comply with several conditions to maintain its license. Id. at 1108-09. The agreement
severely limited what 3K could do without approval of McDonald’s including dictating
what color schemes could be used, the attire, appearance and amount of staff on hand, the
layout of the restaurant’s dining and kitchen areas, and the hours of operation. Id. Despite
the control exerted by McDonald’s Corp., the agreement also stated that the two entities
were not in an agency relationship of any kind. Id. at 1109. The plaintiff sued McDonald’s
Corp. on grounds that 3K was its agent and therefore McDonald’s could be held liable for
the actions of 3K. Id. at 1110. The court held that there was evidence to support a jury
finding that 3K was McDonald’s actual agent. Id. The court reasoned that where a
franchisor goes beyond setting standards and retains the right to exercise control over day
to day operations of the franchisee, an actual agency relationship exists. Id. at 1110. The
court further reasoned that a jury could find that McDonald’s had exercised sufficient
control to establish an actual agency relationship. Id. at 1111. But see, Byron E. Fox &
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Furthermore, the “principal” neither needs to have complete control over
every moment of the agency relationship nor for the control to be
effective at all times.33
The absence of any one of these three elements generally prevents
courts from finding an actual agency relationship.34 When an element of
actual agency is omitted, however, some courts consult section 267 of the
Restatement Second to impart liability upon a principal for the tortious
acts of another.35
2.

Perceived Agency

In tort cases, a third party may hold a pseudo principal liable for the
torts of a pseudo agent if the pseudo principal has intentionally or
negligently held out the pseudo agent as his actual agent and the third
party has relied on that manifestation.36 The Restatement Second refers to
this concept as “apparent agency.”37 However, for purposes of this Note,
“apparent agency” will be referred to as “perceived agency.” The
difference in terminology is made because of the confusion between the

Jennifer L. Jonak, Courts Differ Over Whether a Franchisor’s Control Over a Franchisee Creates
an Agency Relationship that Will Lead to Vicarious Liability for Tortious Conduct, NAT’L L. J.
Dec. 22, 1997, at B5 (arguing that the courts should have looked at whether McDonald’s
Corporation’s control exceeded normal levels rather than just whether they had a right of
control).
32
McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d at 1110 n.3 (citing to Peeples v. Kawasaki Heavy Indust.,
Ltd., 603 P.2d 765 (1979)) (“Under the right to control test it does not matter whether the
putative principal actually exercises control; what is important is that it has the right to do
so.”).
33
Caplaw, 448 F.3d at 523 ( “Nevertheless, the control asserted need not ‘include control
at every moment; its exercise may be very attenuated and, as where the principal is
physically absent, may be ineffective’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT SECOND OF AGENCY § 14).
34
SEAVEY, supra note 22, § 3D at 4.
35
See generally Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 696 N.E.2d 356 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998); B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 370 A.2d 554 (Md. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 276 (1958).
36
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267. Section 267 states:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and
thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of
such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm
caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant
or other agent as if he were such.
Id.
37
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (Section 267 is titled “Reliance upon Care or
Skill of Apparent Servant or Other Agent”).
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concepts of apparent agency and apparent authority, and the similarity
of their respective spellings only exacerbates the problem.38
Perceived agency is a form of estoppel, which focuses on the
principal’s interactions with the third party, rather than focusing on the
principal’s interactions with the agent.39 The requirements of perceived
agency, as laid out in section 267 of the Restatement Second, are two-fold.40
The first requirement is an intentional “holding out” by the
perceived principal that someone is his agent.41 Crinkley v. Holiday Inns,
38
Armato v. Baden, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 301 (Cal. App. Ct. 1999); Baptist Mem’l Hosp.
Sys. v. Sampson 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 n.2 (Tex. 1998) (“Many courts use the terms ostensible
agency, apparent agency, apparent authority, and agency by estoppel interchangeably. As
a practical matter, there is no distinction among them”); State Dep’t of Transp. v. Heckman,
644 So. 2d 527, 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“The doctrine of agency by estoppel is similar
to the doctrine of apparent authority such that there is no significant difference between
them.”); see generally, 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 1 (discussing the
confusion courts have created by using the names perceived agency, apparent agency, and
apparent authority interchangeably).
39
FDL Foods, Inc. v. Kokesch Trucking, Inc., 599 N.E.2d 20, 28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(stating that the doctrine of apparent agency is based on equitable estoppel).
40
See BP Oil, 370 A.2d at 560-61 (Md. 1977) (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY section 267 and stating one is liable for the injuries to a third party if she has held
out to that person that the injurer was her agent and the third party has justifiably relied
upon it). But See Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
The court stated:
This Court has adopted the following three-part test to determine
whether vicarious liability based on an [perceived] agency exists:
[First] The person dealing with the agent must do so with belief in the
agent’s authority and this belief must be a reasonable one; [second]
such belief must be generated by some act or neglect of the principal
sought to be charged; [third] and the third person relying on the
agent’s apparent authority must not be guilty of negligence.
Id.
41
Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 1988); see Gizzi v. Texaco,
Inc., 437 F.2d 308, 309 (3d Cir. 1971). In Gizzi, the plaintiff purchased a used Volkswagen
van from a Texaco service station. Id. The franchisee repaired the brakes before selling the
car, but they failed shortly thereafter. Id. The station prominently displayed Texaco
insignia, including the slogan “Trust your car to the man who wears the star.” Id. Texaco
engaged in considerable national advertising to convey the impression that its dealers were
skilled in automotive servicing. Id. About 30 percent of Texaco dealers sold used cars. Id.
There was a Texaco regional office across the street from the station, and those working in
that office knew that the franchisee was selling cars from the station. Id. The court held
that, under New Jersey law, the question of whether Texaco had held out the station
operator out as its apparent agent was for the jury. Id. at 310. The court further held that
based on the facts, a jury could find that the station operator was an apparent agent of
Texaco. Id.; see also Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978) (holding
that requiring the franchisee to use the Hilton logo, sign, and color scheme to the exclusion
of all others is sufficient to establish that the franchisor held out the franchisee as its agent);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 cmt. a. Comment a states:
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Inc., clearly illustrates the “holding out” requirement.42 In Crinkley, hotel
guests were assaulted by a group dubbed the “Motel Bandits.”43 The
plaintiffs sued the franchisor, Holiday Inn, for inadequate security under
the theory that the operator of the hotel was a perceived agent of
Holiday Inn., Inc.44 The court held that perceived agency was a question
for the jury and that a reasonable jury could find that Holiday Inn had
held out the franchisee as its agent to the third party.45
The second requirement of perceived agency is actual, reasonable
reliance by the injured third party on the manifestations of agency by the
perceived principal.46 Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., illustrates the reliance
required under the doctrine of perceived agency.47 In Miller, the plaintiff
suffered injuries while dining at a McDonald’s restaurant.48 McDonald’s
Corporation was the franchisor of the restaurant; however, the
restaurant was owned and operated by a company called 3K Restaurants
The mere fact that acts are done by one whom the injured party
believes to be the defendant’s servant is not sufficient to cause the
apparent master to be liable. There must be such reliance upon the
manifestation as exposes the plaintiff to the negligent conduct. The
rule normally applies where the plaintiff has submitted himself to the
care or protection of an apparent servant in response to an invitation
from the defendant to enter into such relations with such servant. A
manifestation of authority constitutes an invitation to deal with such
servant and to enter into relations with him which are consistent with
the apparent authority.
Id.; 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 2, 473 (discussing several state courts’
treatments of the holding out requirement).
42
Crinkley, 844 F.2d at 156.
43
Id. at 158-59.
44
Id. at 159. The franchise agreement between Holiday Inn and the hotel operator
required the franchisee to use the “Holiday Inn” trade name and trademarks. Id. at 166-67.
Furthermore, Holiday Inn, Inc. was the original builder of the hotel and engaged in
national advertising that promoted its system of hotels without distinguishing between
those that it owned and those that it franchised. Id. The only indication that the defendant
did not own the hotel was a sign in the restaurant that stated that the franchisee operated
it. Id.
45
Id. at 167.
46
Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1112 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the
crucial issues are whether the defendant held out the franchisee as its agent and whether
the plaintiff relied on that holding out). Williams v. St. Claire Med. Center, 657 S.W.2d 590,
596 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (holding a perceived agency existed because, “[i]n applying the
above legal principles to the situation here presented, it logically follows that the appellant
justifiably believed Johnson to be a hospital employee”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY cmt. a. See generally 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 2, 474
(discussing the different levels of reliance courts’ use and how that affects their analysis).
47
McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d at 1113.
48
Id. at 1108. The plaintiff was injured when she bit into a heart shaped sapphire that
was inside her sandwich. Id.
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(“3K”).49 The plaintiff sued McDonald’s Corporation on the theory that,
even absent an actual agency relationship, McDonald’s Corporation
should be held liable because 3K was its perceived agent.50 The court
agreed holding that summary judgment for McDonald’s Corporation
was improper because there was evidence to support a jury finding that
the plaintiff relied upon McDonald’s Corporation’s holding out of 3K.51
While Miller demonstrates the level of reliance required for
perceived agency, the Restatement Second enumerates several other key
aspects of the doctrine.52 First, the manifestations or “holding out” of the
perceived principal do not have to be intentional.53 In some cases courts
use perceived agency when the perceived principal appears to have
taken insufficient steps to inform the public of the non-agency
relationship.54 Further, courts only require “ordinary knowledge” of
business relationships (i.e. franchises) by third parties seeking to assert
perceived agency.55 The second key aspect of the doctrine of perceived
agency is that it requires actual and reasonable reliance on the
manifestations by the perceived principal.56 The third and final key

49
Id. 3K was allowed to operate the restaurant under a licensing with the McDonald’s
Corporation. Id.
50
Id. at 1111.
51
Id. at 1114. Specifically, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s testimony that she relied
on the general reputation of McDonald’s restaurants in choosing to patronize the
restaurant in question was sufficient evidence to establish a jury question on reliance,
especially when considered in concert with McDonald’s Corporation’s attempt to create a
“public perception of a common McDonald’s system at all McDonald’s.” Id.
52
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958).
53
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03 cmt. b (2006) (“Silence may constitute a
manifestation when, in light of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would express
dissent to the inference that other persons will draw from silence. Failure then to express
dissent will be taken as a manifestation of affirmance.”).
54
See generally McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d at 1107; Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844
F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1988); Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971).
55
McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d at 1113 (holding that to expect that the general public
would know that individual restaurants are owned by a franchisee rather than the
franchisor would demand a higher level of sophistication about general franchise
relationship than the court is willing to assume. Especially in the face of efforts on the part
of the Franchisor to make it appear all of the restaurants are part of a uniform national
system); see also Robert W. Emerson, Franchisors’ Liability When Franchisees are Apparent
Agents: An Empirical and Policy Analysis of “Common Knowledge” About Franchising, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 609, 645-71 (1992) (discussing the Common Knowledge doctrine and
conducting a survey to question the appropriateness of the Common Knowledge doctrine
in the Franchisor-Franchisee liability context).
56
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958) (requiring “a third person justifiably
to rely”) (emphasis added); 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 2, 476
(discussing whether section 267 requires reliance and which form of reliance it requires.
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aspect of perceived agency as laid out in the Restatement Second is that
there is no requirement of a change of position.57
On the other hand, the Restatement Third contains several changes
which may alter how courts apply the doctrine of perceived agency.58
As stated previously, courts consult section 267 of the Restatement Second
to confer perceived agency.59 However, section 267 has been divided
into two different parts under the Restatement Third.60 Under section
7.07, a principal can be held liable for the torts of another if he holds out
to a third party that the other is his employee.61 The language of section
7.07 is very different from the language of section 267 as the drafters
tried to combine several sections into one.62 However, the Comment f
definition of “employee” is very similar to the language of section 267,
except for a change from “represents that another is his servant or other
agent”63 to “causes a third party to believe that an actor is the person’s
employee.”64

Ultimately finding that section 267 does require reliance but only simple or justifiable
reliance.).
57
See supra note 56 and accompanying text. The relevance of this aspect of perceived
agency will become more prevalent when the level of reliance required by agency by
estoppel is discussed later in this Note.
58
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 7.07, 2.05.
59
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267.
60
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY tbls., at 489 (referring readers looking for
Restatement Third sections that correspond to Restatement Second section 267 to sections 7.07
and 2.05).
61
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f.
62
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07. Section 7.07 defines an “Employee Acting
Within Scope of Employment” as follows:
(1) An employer is subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed by
its employee acting within the scope of employment.
(2) An employee acts within the scope of employment when
performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of
conduct subject to the employer’s control. An employee’s act is not
within the scope of employment when it occurs within an independent
course of conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose
of the employer.
(3) For purposes of this section,
(a) an employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to
control the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work, and
(b) the fact that work is performed gratuitously does not relieve a
principal of liability.
Id.
63
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f. The text of section 7.07 cmt. f states in
pertinent part:
A person who causes a third party to believe that an actor is the
person’s employee may be subject to liability to the third party for
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The language shift is significant for two reasons. First, section 267 of
the Restatement Second was used as a basis for finding liability in contexts
other than just an employer-employee relationship.65 Therefore, states
that adopt the Restatement Third may have to look to a section other than
7.07 to impart liability.66 The logical choice would be to use section 2.05
Estoppel to Deny Existence of Agency Relationship.67 This choice leads to the
second reason why the language change in section 7.07 is significant.
Under section 267, a plaintiff only needed to show justifiable reliance to
have a claim of perceived agency.68 However, section 2.05 of the
Restatement Third makes it explicitly clear that in order to claim estoppel
the plaintiff will have to show detrimental reliance.69 As a result of these
changes, it will be harder for plaintiffs to hold perceived principals liable
in relationships other than in the employee-employer context.70
B. Authority to Bind a Principal
After establishing an agency relationship, the agent must possess the
authority to act in order to bind the principal. Restatement Second sets
forth four types of authority: actual;71 apparent;72 incidental;73 and
harm caused by the actor when the third party justifiably relies on the
actor’s skill or care and the actor’s conduct, if that of an employee,
would be within the scope of employment.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267; supra note 36 (providing the full text
of section 267).
64
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f.
65
See generally Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1107 (Or. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding a restaurant franchisor liable for the negligence of a franchisee restaurant owner);
Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding a Hotel chain
franchisor liable for inadequate security at a hotel owned and operated by a franchisee.);
BP Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 370 A.2d 554 (Md. 1977) (attempting to hold a gas station franchisor
liable for the negligence of a franchisee gas station owner).
66
See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the various ways courts that adopt the Restatement
Third may choose to examine agency problems between franchisors and franchisees).
67
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 and parallel tbls. at 489.
68
See supra note 56 and accompanying text. See generally, 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D
Apparent Agency § 2, 476-77.
69
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 cmt. d (“The third party must prove a
reasonable and detrimental change of position. . .”). See also infra Part II.C.5 (discussing the
concept of detrimental reliance).
70
See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of proof in
agency by estoppel cases where change of position is required); see infra notes 225-27 and
accompanying text (discussing how applying Restatement Third § 7.07 to a franchisorfranchisee relationship will cause problems for plaintiff’s attorneys as they would have to
characterize the relationship as employer-employee).
71
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958).
72
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8.
73
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35.
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inherent.74 Conversely, the Restatement Third only recognizes actual and
apparent authority, while incorporating incidental and inherent
authority into several other sections.75 Equally important to the question
of who can bind a principal is the question of how a person can bind the
principal.76
1.

Actual Authority

Actual authority is authority for an agent to act based upon
manifestations by the principal to the agent.77 As previously stated, an
agency relationship requires that the principal maintain the right to
control the acts of the agent performed on the principal’s behalf.78
Actual authority is created when the principal exercises that right of
control by manifesting consent for the agent to act in certain ways.79
However, the manifestations do not have to be explicit.80 If the
manifestations to the agent specify how the agent should act, the actual
authority is called “expressed actual authority.”81 Alternatively, actual
authority may be inferred by the agent from the context in which the

74

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01,

2.02.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01, 2.02; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§§ 2.03, 3.03; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2 int. nt. (referring to incidental authority
as implied authority and stating that inherent authority has been absorbed by other
sections).
76
See infra Parts II.B.1-4.
77
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (“Authority is the power of the agent
to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the principal’s
manifestations of consent to him.”), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (“An
agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal
consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the
principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act”).
78
Cleveland v. Caplaw, 448 F.3d 518, 522 (2d Cir. 2006); Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945
P.2d 1107, 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1.
79
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7.
80
FDL Foods, Inc. v. Kokesch Trucking, Inc., 599 N.E.2d 20, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(declaring that actual authority may be either expressed or implied); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. b (asserting that authorization of an agent’s conduct can be
gleaned from reasonable inferences of the principal’s conduct that the principal intended
the agent to act even if that was not the principal’s intent).
81
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. b (“As commonly used, the term
‘express authority’ often means actual authority that a principal has stated in very specific
or detailed language.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. c (“It is possible for a
principal to specify minutely what the agent is to do. To the extent that he does this, the
agent may be said to have express authority.”).
75
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authority was granted.82 This type of actual authority is referred to as
“implied actual authority.”83 The distinguishing factor between actual
authority and other types of authority is that it is based on the
manifestations from the principal to the agent.84 Further, because actual
authority is based solely on the manifestations of the principal, it is not
contingent upon the principal’s unexpressed wishes or mental state.85
Under actual authority, the agent is not assumed to know everything
that the principal knows.86
The Restatement Third has largely kept the doctrine of actual
authority intact from the Restatement Second.87 Sections 2.01 and 2.02 of
the Restatement Third simply change the wording of actual authority from
section 7 of the Restatement Second, to make it explicit that the section
pertains solely to actual authority.88 However, despite the change in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. c (describing implied authority as powers
which are implied or inferred from the words used, customs, and relationship of the
parties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26. Section 26 states:
Except for the execution of instruments under seal or for the
performance of transactions required by statute to be authorized in a
particular way, authority to do an act can be created by written or
spoken words or other conduct of the principal which, reasonably
interpreted, causes the agent to believe that the principal desires him so to act
on the principal’s account.
Id. (emphasis added).
83
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. b (explaining that implied authority is a
form of actual authority to act in a way that the agent believes the principal wants him to
act); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. c.
84
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (defining actual agency), with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (defining apparent authority).
Compare
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01, 3.01 (defining actual agency), with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.03 3.03 (describing apparent authority); Mared Indus., Inc. v.
Mansfield, 690 N.W.2d 835, 844 (Wis. 2005) (recognizing the doctrinal differences between
actual and apparent authority).
85
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. c (explaining that it is misleading to say
that actual authority reflects the principal’s intentions because the unexpressed intentions
of a principal do not create actual authority unless they are reflected in some form of
manifestation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.01 cmt. c (2006) (explaining that a
principal’s unexpressed willingness for another to act is not grounds for actual authority.
The principal must make a manifestation as defined in section 1.03 in order to create actual
authority).
86
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.01 cmt. c (2006).
87
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 rpt. nt. a (stating there is no intended change
between the Restatement Second and Third with respect to actual authority).
88
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01.
An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action
that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably
believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent,
that the principal wishes the agent so to act.
Id. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 states:
82
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language of sections 2.01 and 2.02, the comments to those sections show
that, in practice, these sections will operate the same way as section 7 of
the Restatement Second.89
2.

Apparent Authority

The second type of authority, apparent authority, arises through
manifestations by the principal to a third party.90 There are several ways
for an agent to attain apparent authority.91 Direct communication from
the principal to the third party would qualify as creating apparent
authority; however, that is not the only way in which apparent authority
may be created.92 Manifestations may also come from the principal
(1) An agent has actual authority to take action designated or implied
in the principal’s manifestations to the agent and acts necessary or
incidental to achieving the principal’s objectives, as the agent
reasonably understands the principal’s manifestations and objectives
when the agent determines how to act.
(2) An agent’s interpretation of the principal’s manifestations is
reasonable if it reflects any meaning known by the agent to be ascribed
by the principal and, in the absence of any meaning known to the
agent, as a reasonable person in the agent’s position would interpret
the manifestations in light of the context, including circumstances of
which the agent has notice and the agent’s fiduciary duty to the
principal.
(3) An agent’s understanding of the principal’s objectives is reasonable
if it accords with the principal’s manifestations and the inferences that
a reasonable person in the agent’s position would draw from the
circumstances creating the agency.
Id.
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01 cmts. a-c, 2.02 cmts. a-h (2006), and
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Recovery Express, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D. Mass. 2006) (citing the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 2) (Mar. 2001) (stating that an agent
acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action the agent reasonably believes
that the principal wishes the agent so to act), with FDL Foods, Inc. v. Kokesch Trucking,
Inc., 599 N.E.2d 20, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (citing Section 7 of the Restatement Second) (stating
that actual authority may be expressed or implied), and Currey v. Lone Star Steel Co., 676
S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App. Ct. 1984) (stating that actual authority is authority that the principal
confers on the agent, allows the agent to believe that he has, or by want of due care allows
the agent to believe he has); Mared Indus., Inc. v. Mansfield, 690 N.W.2d 835 (Wis. 2005)
(citing to the Restatement Second section 7, stating actual authority is the power of an agent
to act on behalf of the principal because the principal has made a manifestation to allow the
agent to so act).
90
SEAVEY, supra note 22, § 8D at 13.
91
See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (explaining the ways an agent can receive
apparent authority through a principal’s manifestations to a third party); see supra notes 8187 and accompanying text (discussing the ways an agent can be given actual authority
through manifestations by the principal).
92
Lind v. Schenley Indus., 278 F.2d 79, 86 (3d Cir. 1960) (finding that a company owed
its employee money from a raise in which the employee was told by the Vice President to
89
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telling the agent to misinform the third party of the agent’s authority.93
Further, the authority may be created by the principal placing the agent
in a position which would lead third parties to believe that the agent has
such authority.94 Once the principal has made a manifestation, apparent
authority requires that the third party reasonably believe that the agent
has authority, and that the belief be traceable to the principal’s
manifestations.95 A principal may not be bound by apparent authority if
the third party’s belief that the agent had authority was unreasonable.96
talk with his supervisor and the supervisor, despite having no actual authority to make an
offer, told the employee he would get a 1% commission on sales of the people below the
employee). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. c. “Manifestations as
defined in § 1.03 may take many forms. These include explicit statements that a principal
makes directly to a third party.” Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27.
Except for the execution of instruments under seal or for the conduct of
transactions required by statute to be authorized in a particular way,
apparent authority to do an act is created as to a third person by
written or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal which,
reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the
principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person
purporting to act for him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27; see also SEAVEY, supra note 22, § 8D at 13.
93
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 cmt. b. “A principal may also create apparent
authority by actually or apparently authorizing an agent to make representations to third
parties concerning the agent’s own authority or position, even though the agent’s
representations by themselves would be insufficient.” Id.; SEAVEY, supra note 22, § 8D at 13.
94
Three-Seventy Leasing Corp. v. Ampex Corp., 528 F.2d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1976). In
Ampex, Three-Seventy filed a suit against Ampex for breach of contract. Id. at 995. As a
result of negotiations between the owner and sole employee of Three-Seventy and a
salesman for Ampex, a writing was produced by Ampex to sell Three-Seventy six
computer memory units. Id. The owner of Three-Seventy signed the writing; however, the
court found that a contract did not exist because there was no meeting of the minds. Id. at
995-96. In the alternative, the court held that Ampex was bound to sell the memory units
because their salesman had apparent authority to bind Ampex. Id. at 997. Absent
manifestations to the contrary, an agent has apparent authority to do those things which
are usual to the business which the agent is employed to conduct. Id. Additionally, it was
reasonable for a third person to believe that a salesman had authority to bind his employer
to sell items. Id.; see also Hallock v. State, 474 N.E.2d 1178, 1182 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that,
absent manifestations that limit an attorney’s actual authority, an attorney is clothed with
apparent authority to enter into settlements by nature of her position). But see Sarkes
Tarzian, Inc. v. U.S. Trust Co. of Fl. Savings Bank, 397 F.3d 577, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding
that there was no ground to submit a question of apparent agency to the jury since the
defendant made no manifestations to the plaintiff that the defendant’s attorney had
authority to bind them to a contract).
95
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (omitting any requirement that the third
party detrimentally rely, i.e. change position, on the manifestation, and instead only
requiring the reliance be reasonable); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 cmt. b.
96
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 2.03 cmt. c (Section 2.03 requires that the third party reasonably believe the agent has
authority and that the reasonableness will reflect business custom, usage particular to the
industry, and prior dealings).
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Further, an agent cannot bind a principal by tricking the third party into
believing that the agent has authority.97
The Restatement Third retains the doctrine of apparent authority
unchanged from the Restatement Second.98 However, the Restatement
Third provides a deeper analysis of the issue.99 Namely, the Restatement
Third points out some unique attributes to apparent authority which are
not present in actual authority.100 For example, apparent authority may
exist even after the agency relationship has been terminated.101 Also, the
exercise of apparent authority by an agent may create a cause of action
for the principal against the agent.102
Treatment of apparent authority by the courts has varied as the
doctrine has developed.103 Many courts assert that the doctrine of
apparent authority is indistinguishable from the doctrines of perceived
(apparent) agency and agency by estoppel.104 However, both the
Restatement Third and Restatement Second recognize that while apparent
97
Sarkes Tarzian, 397 F.3d at 583 (“New York explicitly rejects the idea that an agent can
confer apparent authority on him or herself.”); Hallock, 474 N.E.2d at 1181 (“The agent
cannot by his own acts imbue himself with apparent authority.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. c (“An agent’s success in misleading the third party as to the existence
of actual authority does not in itself make the principal accountable”).
98
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 rpt. n. a.
99
See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
100
See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
101
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. a; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 3.11. Section 3.11, titled “Termination of Apparent Authority” states: “(1) The
termination of actual authority does not by itself end any apparent authority held by an
agent. (2) Apparent authority ends when it is no longer reasonable for the third party with
whom an agent deals to believe that the agent continues to act with actual authority.” Id.
102
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. a.
[T]he formulation in this section defines an agent’s “power,” which if
exercised in a manner not coincident with actual authority, is not
rightful as toward the principal. An agent who appears to a third
party to be authorized, but who lacks actual authority, would breach
the agent’s duty to the principal by acting in excess of actual authority.
See § 8.09. The principal has a claim against the agent for any loss
incurred.
Id.
103
See generally Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. US Trust Co. of Fl. Savings Bank, 397 F.3d 577 (7th
Cir. 2005); Hallock v. New York, 474 N.E.2d 1178 (N.Y. 1984); Three-Seventy Leasing Corp.
v. Ampex Corp., 528 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1976).
104
Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 n.2 (Tex. 1998) (“Many
courts use the terms ostensible agency, apparent agency, apparent authority, and agency
by estoppel interchangeably. As a practical matter, there is no distinction among them”);
see also, Armato v. Baden, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 301 (Cal. App. Ct. 1999). See generally, 6 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 1 (discussing the confusion courts have created by using the
names perceived agency, apparent agency and apparent authority interchangeably).
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authority contains elements of estoppel, it is a distinct concept from
perceived agency and agency by estoppel.105 Each Restatement points
out that perceived agency and agency by estoppel are used to create an
agency relationship where one does not exist, while apparent authority
expands an agent’s authority within an independently created agency
relationship.106 As a result, both Restatements maintain a distinction
among apparent authority, perceived agency, and estoppel. 107
3.

Incidental Authority

The third type of authority, incidental authority, is the authority for
an agent to perform the tasks which are concomitant to accomplishing
the authorized act.108 The doctrine of incidental authority provides an
agent with authority, even though the principal’s manifestations are not
sufficiently clear or all encompassing.109 The illustrations for Restatement
Second section 35 provide clear examples of what type of actions are
considered to be within an agent’s incidental authority.110
The
Restatement Third, on the other hand, simply incorporated incidental
authority into its definition of actual authority, thereby eliminating the
need for a separate section on the issue.111
4.

Inherent Authority

The scope and reach of the fourth type of authority, inherent
authority, have been relatively limited.112 In fact, to date, only one court
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. e; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 8 cmt. d (1958).
106
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. d (1958).
107
Id.
108
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35. “Unless otherwise agreed, authority to
conduct a transaction includes authority to do acts which are incidental to it, usually
accompany it, or are reasonably necessary to accomplish it.” Id.
109
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35 cmt. b.
110
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35 illus. 1-4.
111
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 cmt. d.
If a principal’s manifestation to an agent expresses the principal’s wish
that something be done, it is natural to assume that the principal
wishes, as an incidental matter, that the agent take the steps necessary
and that the agent proceed in the usual and ordinary way, if such has
been established, unless the principal directs otherwise.
The
underlying assumptions are that the principal does not wish to
authorize what cannot be achieved if necessary steps are not taken by
the agent, and that the principal’s manifestation often will not specify
all steps necessary to translate it into action.
Id.
112
See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
105
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of last resort, the Indiana Supreme Court, has adopted the doctrine.113
However, a few intermediate courts have used the doctrine to bind a
principal.114 Inherent authority binds a principal in cases where no
actual or apparent authority exists and the elements of estoppel are not
present.115 The doctrine was created for two reasons: “the need to
ensure fairness for the parties dealing with the agent and the goal of
promoting the general commercial convenience of all parties
involved.”116 However, with growing concerns for the doctrine’s
seemingly boundless possibilities, the drafters of the Restatement Third
decided to eliminate the section and absorb some of its concepts into

113
See generally Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206 (Ind. 2000). In Menard,
Inc., Menard Inc. sued for specific performance of a contract for the purchase of a thirty
acre piece of property. Id. at 1210. The defendant, Dage-MTI, Inc., claimed that the
contract was not enforceable because it was only signed by the President of Dage-MTI and
was not approved by the board of directors, which was required by a board resolution. Id.
at 1209-10. The court held that despite the board’s continual reminder to the President that
any offer would have to be approved by the board, the Dage-MTI was bound to the
contract by the President. Id. at 1216. The court reasoned that Dage-MTI’s President acted
as Dage-MTI’s agent, possessed inherent authority and, therefore, bound the company. Id.
at 1216. The court further reasoned that the President had inherent authority because he
acted within the usual and ordinary scope of his authority, Menard reasonably believed the
President to have the authority, and Menard had no notice that the President’s actions were
not authorized. Id. at 1213-16.
114
E.g., Kahn v. Royal Banks of Mo., 790 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). In Kahn, a
dispute arose over whether a husband and wife were jointly liable for a loan the husband
secured on both of their behalves. Id. at 506. The wife had signed a power of attorney
giving the husband the right to act on her behalf. Id. However, when the bank foreclosed
on the loan the wife filed suit claiming she was note liable for the debts. Id. The wife
argued that because the husband had acted in self interest and not her interest he was
acting without authority to bind her to the loans. Id. The court held that the husband had
acted with inherent authority and therefore held the wife jointly liable for the debt. Id. at
509. Due to the fact that the bank was unaware that the husband was breaching his
fiduciary duties to his wife, the husband was acting with inherent authority, and therefore
bound the wife as principal to the husband’s dealings with the bank, a third party. Id.
115
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A.
Inherent agency power is a term used in the restatement of this subject
to indicate the power of an agent which is derived not from authority,
apparent authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency relation and
exists for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing with a
servant or other agent.
Id.
116
Gregory Scott Crespi, The Proposed Abolition of Inherent Agency Authority by the
Restatement (Third) Of Agency: An Incomplete Solution, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 344
(2005) (discussing section 8A comment a of the Restatement Second of Agency).
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other areas.117 For that reason this note will not discuss the doctrine
further.118
C. An Alternate Theory for Binding a Principal: Estoppel
Beyond the “traditional” concepts of agency and authority, both the
Restatement Second and Restatement Third contain a section on estoppel.119
In agency law, estoppel is viewed as a net that allows courts the freedom
to hold a principal liable in cases where the agent is lacking either an
agency relationship or authority to bind the principal.120 Estoppel can
also be used to prevent a principal from denying an agency relationship
or authority; however, estoppel is preempted by all other doctrines
contained within the Restatements.121 In order for estoppel to apply,
therefore, courts must be sure that no other doctrines within the
Restatements apply. Part II.C scrutinizes the doctrine of estoppel by
examining its requirements under the Restatements, how it has been used
by the courts, and how it is distinguished from similar concepts like
perceived agency and apparent authority.122
The doctrine of estoppel is deeply rooted in American and English
jurisprudence.123 Several treatises on the subject provide a good
background of the topic.124 However, for purposes of agency law,
estoppel is defined in section 8b of the Restatement Second and section
2.05 of the Restatement Third.125

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2 intro. note; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
parallel tbls (2006); see Crespi, supra note 116, at 344 (discussing section 8A comment a of
Restatement Second of Agency).
118
See Crespi, supra note 116; Matthew P. Ward, A Restatement or a Redefinition:
Elimination Of Inherent Agency in the Tentative Draft of The Restatement (Third) Of Agency, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1585 (2002) (discussing the American Law Institute’s decision to
eliminate the doctrine of inherent authority from the Restatement Third).
119
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8b.
120
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2 int. nt. 4 (2006).
121
Id.
122
See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing agency law’s treatment of estoppel generally and
specifically the doctrine of agency by estoppel).
123
As such, an attempt to give adequate depth to the history of the doctrine in this Note
would be both an exercise in futility and well beyond the scope of this Note.
124
See generally ELIZABETH COOKE, THE MODERN LAW OF ESTOPPEL (Oxford University
Press 2000); ALEXANDER KINGCOME TURNER, THE LAW RELATING TO ESTOPPEL BY
REPRESENTATION (Butterworths & Co. 1966).
125
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05.
A person who has not made a manifestation that an actor has authority
as an agent and who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction
purportedly done by the actor on that person’s account is subject to
117
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Under the Restatement Second, an individual is estopped from
denying an agency relationship if he intentionally or carelessly caused a
belief in a third person that one is acting on his behalf or, knowing of the
belief, failed to correct the mistake and caused the third party to change
position in reliance on that belief.126 As at least one jurisdiction in Texas
has noted, estoppel is closely related to several other agency doctrines.127
However, to say that the doctrines are equivalent would be incorrect.128
Apparent authority, for example, is analytically similar to estoppel;
however, estoppel, as defined in both the Restatement Second and Third,
does not necessarily require that the third party’s belief be directly
traceable to the principal in order to apply.129 For instance, in order for
there to be a claim of apparent authority, the third party’s belief must be

liability to a third party who justifiably is induced to make a
detrimental change in position because the transaction is believed to be
on the person’s account, if
(1) the person intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or
(2) having notice of such belief and that it might induce others to
change their positions, the person did not take reasonable steps to
notify them of the facts.
Id. Further:
(1) A person who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction
purported to be done on his account, is nevertheless subject to liability
to persons who have changed their positions because of their belief
that the transaction was entered into by or for him, if
(a) he intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or
(b) knowing of such belief and that others might change their positions
because of it, he did not take reasonable steps to notify them of the
facts.
(2) An owner of property who represents to third persons that another
is the owner of the property or who permits the other so to represent,
or who realizes that third persons believe that another is the owner of
the property, and that he could easily inform the third persons of the
facts, is subject to the loss of the property if the other disposes of it to
third persons who, in ignorance of the facts, purchase the property or
otherwise change their position with reference to it.
(3) Change of position, as the phrase is used in the restatement of this
subject, indicates payment of money, expenditure of labor, suffering a
loss or subjection to legal liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8b (1958).
126
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8b.
127
Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 n.2 (Tex. 1998) (“Many
courts use the terms ostensible agency, apparent agency, apparent authority, and agency
by estoppel interchangeably. As a practical matter, there is no distinction among them.”).
128
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 cmt c (discussing how estoppel is different
than the doctrines of actual and apparent authority).
129
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 cmt. d (discussing that estoppel applies even
in cases where a third party belief is not directly traceable to the principal).
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traceable to a manifestation on the part of the principal.130 Estoppel, on
the other hand, does not require as close a fit between the third party’s
belief and the principal.131
Hoddeson v. Koos Bros.,132 which is the basis for Illustration Two from
the Restatement Third section 2.05, was the first case to use agency by
estoppel to confer liability.133 In Hoddeson, Ms. Hoddeson entered a
furniture store owned by Koos Brothers to make a purchase.134 While in
the store, Ms. Hoddeson was approached by a man who appeared to
work for Koos Brothers.135 The man then proceeded to take notes,
presumably recording her order, as Ms. Hoddeson selected furniture to
purchase.136 At the end of the discussion, Ms. Hoddeson paid for the
furniture and left the store.137 After waiting for a period of time past the
expected delivery date, Ms. Hoddeson went back to the store to inquire
what was causing the delay.138 When she returned, Koos Brothers’
employees informed her that they had no record of the transaction.139 It
was assumed that the man who had helped her had not been a member

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 cmt. d.
132
135 A.2d 702 (N.J. 1957).
133
Id; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 illus. 2 (2006). Illustration 2 states:
P owns a large retail furniture store, known as “P’s Furniture
Emporium.” P, who is often absent from the premises, does not
otherwise maintain surveillance over the store’s sales force. T, a
prospective customer, enters the store and is approached by A, whose
demeanor and attire lend A the appearance of a salesperson. After
examining floor samples, T purchases several items of furniture for
cash, giving the cash to A. A gives T a receipt written on a standardlooking form, with “P’s Furniture Emporium” printed at the top. A
explains to T that the items purchased are not presently in inventory
but will be delivered to T’s home within two weeks. A is an imposter
who is not an employee or other agent of P. A does not remit any of
the cash paid by T to P. No furniture is delivered to T. T’s change of
position is justified by T’s belief that A is what A purports to be, a
salesperson with authority to sell from P’s inventory. Whether P may
deny A’s authority is a question for the trier of fact.
134
Hoddeson, 135 A.2d at 703.
135
Id. The man was dressed in a suit, and as he approach he asked her if he could be of
some help. Id.
136
Id. at 704.
137
Id. The man informed Ms. Hoddeson that the furniture she had picked out was not in
stock and would have to be shipped to her. Id. Ms. Hoddeson then gave the man $168.50
in payment for the items and left the store without receiving a receipt. Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
130
131
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of the sales staff at all.140 The court remanded the case based on a lack of
evidence and findings by the lower court to hold that the “apparent”
salesman was an agent with any kind of authority to bind the furniture
store.141 However, the court held that under a theory of estoppel,
regardless of whether the salesman had authority, the furniture store
could not escape liability by disavowing an agency relationship where it
had failed to adequately protect its customers from people falsely
pretending to be salesmen.142
Another distinction among estoppel, apparent authority, and
perceived agency is the level of reliance required.143 Most jurisdictions
only require justifiable reliance in cases where an actual agency
relationship is lacking.144 However, at least one jurisdiction, Illinois, has
adopted estoppel and its requisite detrimental reliance/change of
position where an actual agency relationship does not exist.145
In Gasbarra v. St. James Hospital,146 the plaintiff sued a hospital for
improper care by physicians in the hospital’s emergency room.147 The
hospital asserted, as a defense, that it could not be held liable because the
physicians were independent contractors.148 In response, the plaintiff
claimed that, despite the lack of actual agency, the hospital was liable
under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.149 The court held that there
were insufficient grounds to hold the hospital liable under the doctrine

Id. Both Ms. Hoddeson and her aunt, who had accompanied her on the day of the
purchase, were unable to positively identify the man who had helped them from the
regular sales staff that worked at the store. Id. Both did acknowledge that one man bore a
resemblance to the man that had helped them but a subsequent examination of Koos
Brothers records showed the identified man was on vacation the day the women were in
the store. Id.
141
Id. at 706.
142
Id. at 706-07.
143
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (stating reliance as “. . . a third party who
justifiably is induced to make a detrimental change in position because the transaction is
believed to be on the person’s account. . . ”); see also supra note 97 and accompanying text;
supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
144
See supra Part II.A.2.
145
Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 406 N.E.2d 544, 554-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
146
Id.; see also Keith Phoenix & Anne L. Schlueter, Hospital Liability for the Acts of
Independent Contractors: The Ostensible Agency Doctrine, 30 St. LOUIS U. L.J. 875, 885 (1986)
(discussing the facts and holding in Gasbarra).
147
Gasbarra, 406 N.E.2d at 548.
148
Id. The emergency room physicians were employed by the Doctors Emergency Care
Association and were independent contractors not employee agents of the hospital. Id.
149
Id. at 554.
140
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of estoppel because the plaintiff failed to show any detrimental change of
position.150
Estoppel is distinct from apparent authority and perceived agency
because estoppel, as applied by most jurisdictions, requires a more
stringent form of reliance.151
Furthermore, the Restatement Third
Introductory Note Four demonstrates that apparent authority and
estoppel are related but separate doctrines, stating:
Estoppel is relevant to agency when a representation is
made that one person has authority to act on behalf of
another. In this Restatement, when doctrines other than
estoppel are applicable to a situation, those doctrines
govern. Unlike many cases, but like Restatement
Second, Agency, this Restatement treats apparent
authority as a doctrine distinct from estoppel. It does so
to clarify the law and to make clear when and why it is
necessary for a plaintiff to show detrimental reliance.152
By asserting that agency doctrines preempt the doctrine of estoppel, the
Restatement Third recognizes that estoppel’s applicability, as defined in
that Restatement, overlaps the applicability of apparent authority and
perceived agency to hold a person liable for the acts of another.153
The law of agency embodies concepts from several areas of law
including but not limited to torts and contracts.154 As a result, there has
been much confusion over which doctrines apply in different
circumstances.155 However, while the Restatement Third is a useful tool to
help guide courts in evaluating agency problems, it is a secondary source
and as such should not stand in the way of a court’s ability to find a
result that is equitable and just.

Id. at 555. The court reasoned that the facts supported the conclusion that the plaintiff
relied on the manifestations of the hospital; however, the plaintiff had failed to present any
evidence that she changed her position (i.e. failed to take her child to another hospital)
which is required to support an estoppel claim. Id.
151
See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text (explaining the how estoppel requires a
more stringent form of reliance than the doctrines of apparent authority and perceived
agency).
152
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2 int. nt. 4 (2006) (detrimental reliance is required
by estoppel unlike apparent authority which only requires justifiable reliance).
153
Id.
154
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY.
155
See supra Part II.
150
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III. ANALYSIS
The doctrine of perceived agency embodies characteristics similar to
estoppel.156 Thus, what is the significant difference between estoppel
and perceived agency? As a corollary, should courts retain both
doctrines? An examination of cases interpreting these doctrines shows
that the major distinguishing characteristic embodied in Restatement
Second sections 267 and 8b, respectively, is the reliance required by each
doctrine.157 Under perceived agency, a plaintiff is only required to show
that he justifiably relied upon the manifestations of the principal when
dealing with an agent.158 By comparison, under the doctrine of agency
by estoppel, a plaintiff is required to show that he was justified in relying
upon the principal’s manifestations and that he changed his position
based upon that reliance.159 It is clear that there is a need for an agency
doctrine which protects third parties who rely on manifestations by a
principal that another is their agent. However, the doctrines must be
flexible enough to protect consumers, while not discouraging business
from working together in new and creative ways. Requiring detrimental
reliance in cases of third party reliance where no agency relationship
exists will do just that.
One scholar, Joseph H. King, argues that the reliance required by
perceived agency is, in fact, the detrimental reliance of estoppel.160
However, the Michigan Court of Appeals is the only authority King cites
concluding that courts require such detrimental reliance in perceived
agency cases. 161 Yet, a close examination of that case reveals another
interpretation.162 The vast majority of cases relying on the Restatement

156
157

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III. See generally, 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 2, 474-

75.
See generally, 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 2, 474-75.
Id.
160
Joseph H. King Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of Their
Franchisees, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 417, 446-56 (2005). Mr. King argues that perceived
agency requires four prongs of reliance: Actual Reliance; Actually Attaching Importance to
the Manifestation; Justified in Believing the Truth of the Manifestation; and Justified in
Attaching Importance to the Manifestation. Id. at 448-59. He further argues that Actually
Attaching Importance to the Manifestations is the detrimental reliance prong of perceived
agency reliance. Id. at 449-56.
161
Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
162
See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (examining the holding in Little v.
Howard Johnson and arguing that the court did not actually require detrimental reliance
change of position).
158
159
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Second section 267 only require justifiable reliance.163 The different levels
of reliance would not be troublesome except that nearly every instance in
which a court relies on section 267 to impart liability could just as easily
fall under section 8b estoppel.164 Further, the Restatement Third failed to
fix the problem when it maintained the distinction between perceived
agency and agency by estoppel.165 Because the language of Restatement
Second section 267 was retained almost completely in Restatement Third
section 7.07 Comment f, courts choosing to adopt the Restatement Third
can maintain the distinction between justifiable and detrimental
reliance.166 Part III.A of this Note analyzes how courts have discussed
and utilized the Restatement Second in determining liability for Employers
and Franchisors. Part III.B examines how applying sections 7.07 and 2.05
of the Restatement Third may alter a court’s analysis of employer and
franchisor liability.
A. Restatement Second: A Confusion of Doctrines by the Courts
1.

Employer – Employee Relationships

One of the two broad circumstances in which courts have applied
agency by estoppel or perceived agency is when the third party believed
the person was an employee of the principal and, therefore, believed the
person to be an agent of the principal. Although only moderately
common, this situation has the capability of arising in an enormous
number of settings. Part III.A.1.a. examines the courts reasoning in the
watershed case for using agency by estoppel to impart liability, Hoddeson
v. Koos Bros.167 Part III.A.1.b. analyzes courts’ decisions on conferring
liability to hospitals for the acts of independent contractor physicians.168

See supra notes 46-57 (discussing the reliance required for perceived agency); see also 6
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 2 at 476-77.
164
See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
165
See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (examining how the Restatement Third
altered the doctrine of perceived agency’s language from the Restatement Second); supra Part
II.C. (reviewing the Restatement Second and Third’s treatment of estoppel).
166
See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (considering a court’s options for
applying Restatement Third § 7.07).
167
See infra Part III.A.1.a (breaking down the court’s reasoning in Hoddeson and
hypothecating reasons for the courts lack of discussion on detrimental reliance).
168
See infra Part III.A.1.b (comparing reasoning in applying agency by estoppel or
perceived agency in cases of torts committed by independent contractor physicians).
163
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Salesmen: Attempts to Define a Doctrine

The seminal case for using estoppel to hold a business responsible
for the acts of an apparent salesman is Hoddeson v. Koos Bros.169 The
Hoddeson court remanded the case, making no finding as to whether the
furniture store was actually estopped from denying the agency
relationship.170 However, the court reasoned that agency by estoppel
may be appropriate in these types of cases.171 Although the court’s
reasoning followed that of the Restatement Second, sections 8b and 267,
noticeably missing from the court’s discussion was the degree of reliance
required. The court only indirectly mentioned the degree of reliance by
stating that the principal should be estopped if the acts of the perceived
agent would lead a person of “ordinary prudence and circumspection to
believe that the imposter was . . . the proprietor’s agent.”172 This
description of reliance lacks the detrimental reliance change of position
language, which is the touchstone of estoppel analysis.173 The omission
of the detrimental reliance language is likely the product of two factors.
First, the facts of Hoddeson demonstrate so clearly that there was
detrimental reliance that it was likely uncontested by the defendant and,
as such, the court did not feel compelled to discuss it in the case.174
Second, Hoddeson was decided a year before the Restatement Second was
published, and the Restatement (First) of Agency did not include a section
on estoppel.175 The combination of Ms. Hoddeson’s obvious change of
position with no Restatement section expressly requiring detrimental

169
See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of
Hoddeson v. Koos. Brothers).
170
Hoddeson v. Koos Bros., 135 A.2d 702 (N.J. 1957).
171
Id. at 707.
[W]here a proprietor of a place of business by his dereliction of duty
enables one who is not his agent conspicuously to act as such and
ostensibly to transact the proprietor’s business with a patron in the
establishment, the appearances being of such a character as to lead a
person of ordinary prudence and circumspection to believe that the
impostor was in truth the proprietor’s agent, in such circumstances the
law will not permit the proprietor defensively to avail himself of the
impostor’s lack of authority and thus escape liability for the
consequential loss thereby sustained by the customer.
Id.
172
Id.
173
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
174
See supra note 153 and accompanying text. It is uncontestable that had Ms. Hoddeson
known the “salesman” that approached her in the store that day was not really an
employee of Koos Brothers, she would not have placed her order and given him the
money.
175
See generally, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY (1933).
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reliance likely led the court to omit any meaningful discussion of the
reliance required by agency by estoppel.
b.

Independent Contractor Physicians: Uncertainty in Choosing a Doctrine

Courts’ treatment of the relationship between hospitals and their
independent contractor physicians varies by jurisdiction.176
Most
jurisdictions use perceived agency to confer liability on hospitals;
however, a minority of jurisdictions, most notably Illinois, rejected
perceived agency in favor of using agency by estoppel.177 Because of the
additional requirement of change of position, it is much harder for a
plaintiff to prevail in jurisdictions that use agency by estoppel.178
Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center179 and Gasbarra v. St. James Hospital
demonstrate the different ways courts have examined the relationship
between a hospital and its independent contractor physicians.180
When courts apply the Restatement Second section 267 in an
employer-employee relationship, change of position is not required in
order to have a valid claim.181 In applying the doctrine of perceived
agency to the facts, the St. Claire Medical Center court recognized that, by
failing to give the plaintiff notice that the anesthesiologist was not an
employee of the hospital, it held him out as such.182 Further, in
discussing the plaintiff’s reliance, the court stated that the plaintiff’s
belief that the anesthesiologist was an employee of the hospital was

See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.2; see also Ferraro and Camarra, Hospital Liability: Apparent Agency or
Agency by Estoppel, 76 ILL. B.J. 364 (1988) (discussing Illinois’ refusal to follow other
jurisdictions’ lead of adopting perceived agency in hospital liability cases). But see
Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 406 N.E.2d 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (supp. opinion).
178
See infra notes 235-38 (discussing the difficulties of bringing a claim that requires
change of position); see also Phoenix & Schlueter, supra note 147, at 885. They state:
the most difficult aspect of the [agency by estoppel] theory from the
plaintiff’s perspective is the inherent proof problem. To recover under
this doctrine, a plaintiff must establish . . . that the representation
caused the plaintiff’s reliance on the care or skill of the apparent agent
to the plaintiff’s detriment.
Phoenix & Schlueter, supra note 147, at 885.
179
Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center, 657 S.W.2d 590, 596 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
180
See infra notes 182-90 and accompanying text (describing how courts treated hospital
liability differently in the case of independent contractor physicians).
181
St. Claire, 657 S.W.2d at 592. The hospital denied liability on the basis that the surgeon
and nurse who administered the anesthetics were independent contractors and the hospital
was not vicariously liable for their acts. The court disagreed and stated that the hospital
could be held liable under perceived agency as set forth in the Restatement Second. Id.
182
Id.
176
177
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justifiable, omitting any discussion of change of position.183 By contrast,
Illinois has rejected the use of perceived agency in the context of hospital
liability.184
In Gasbarra, the plaintiff sought recovery for the malpractice of a
physician that resulted in the death of her child.185 In a supplemental
opinion, the court discussed the plaintiff’s agency claim.186 The court
found that no actual agency relationship existed, and without mention of
perceived agency, rejected the plaintiff’s claim for agency by estoppel.187
In finding that there was no merit to the plaintiff’s claim for agency by
estoppel, the court stated that the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence
in the record that suggested she changed her position based on a belief
that the emergency room physicians were employees of the hospital.188
In other words, the plaintiff failed to show evidence that if she had
known the physicians were not employees of the hospital she would
have chosen to take her child to another hospital.189 Accordingly,
requiring change of position in this context makes it much harder for
plaintiffs to hold hospitals vicariously liable for the acts of their
independent contractor physicians.190
2.

Franchisor – Franchisee Relationships

Despite the fact that Illinois courts have used agency by estoppel and
rejected perceived agency in one context, no jurisdiction has been willing
to apply agency by estoppel to franchisor-franchisee relationships.191
Franchisor–franchisee relationships are present in a wide variety of
business enterprises, and imposition of liability on franchisors for the
acts of franchisees, absent actual agency, has been commonly based upon
section 267 of the Restatement Second.192 Furthermore, as the Oregon
Id.
Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 406 N.E.2d 544, 548 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that
Illinois rejects the justifiable reliance required by other states and dismisses Gasbarra’s
claim of perceived agency on grounds that she has failed to show a detrimental reliance
change of position).
185
See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
186
Gasbarra, 406 N.E.2d at 553.
187
Id. at 554-55.
188
Id. at 555.
189
Id.
190
See supra note 178.
191
See infra Part III.A.2.
192
See Randall K. Hanson, The Franchising Dilemma: Franchisor Liability for Action of a Local
Franchisee, 19 N.C. CENT. L.J. 190, 198 (1991) [hereinafter Dilemma]; Randall K. Hanson, The
Franchising Dilemma Continues: Update on Franchisor Liability for Wrongful Acts By Local
Franchisees, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 91, 99-100 (1997) [hereinafter Continues].
183
184
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Court of Appeals reasoned in Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., “[t]he crucial
issues are whether the putative principal held the third party out as an
agent and whether the plaintiff relied on that holding out.”193
Courts consider a variety of factors to find that a franchisor has
“held out” a franchisee as its agent.194 Among those factors courts have
most notably deliberated are the effects of a franchisor’s national
advertising and a franchisee’s use of the franchisor’s name and insignia
on signs and other displays in the store.195 As to the question of reliance,
courts have almost uniformly announced and applied the requirement of
justifiable reliance rather than detrimental reliance/change of position.196
The lone case which applies Restatement Second section 267 and
expressly states that change of position is required is Crinkley v. Holiday
Inns, Inc.197 However, as the court applied the test for perceived agency,
the requirement of change of position was absent.198 The court reviewed
the evidence and found plenty of support for the notion that the
Crinkleys had actually relied on Holiday Inn, Inc.’s representations.199
However, the court did not mention any testimony or evidence that the
Crinkley’s would have chosen not to stay at the Holiday Inn had they
been informed that the Hotel was owned and operated by anyone other
than Holiday Inn, Inc. Thus, while the court claimed to be requiring
detrimental reliance/change of position of the plaintiffs, in reality it
applied the lower standard of justifiable reliance.
Little v. Howard Johnson Co. is another case often cited as an example
of a court requiring detrimental reliance/change of position in perceived
agency analysis.200 The belief that the court required detrimental
reliance/change of position is based on the court’s statement, “[h]ere,
plaintiff has failed to offer any documentary evidence that she was
Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1112 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
King, supra note 161 at 441.
195
Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 1988) (relying on national
advertising to establish a holding out); Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 199
(Del. 1978) (relying on franchisor’s requirement that franchisee use the franchisor’s trade
name and insignia); Gizzi v. Texaco, 437 F.2d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 1971) (relying on national
advertising to establish a holding out).
196
See supra Part II.A.2.
197
844 F.2d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 1988).
198
Id. at 167.
199
Id. (stating the Crinkleys chose to find another Holiday Inn when there was no room
at a Holiday Inn close to there destination. Also noting Mr. Crinkley’s testimony that he
was surprised to find out that Holiday Inn, Inc. was not involved in the operation of the
hotel).
200
Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
193
194
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harmed as a result of relying on the perceived fact that the franchisee
was an agent of defendant.”201 Taken by itself, the court’s statement
appears to suggest that detrimental reliance/change of position is
required. However, when viewed in light of the facts of the case,
another reading emerges.202
Little involved a restaurant customer slipping and falling on an icy
sidewalk.203 Arguably, the conditions which caused the plaintiff’s injury
were completely unrelated to the aspects of the restaurant that the
franchisor would have promoted, as uniform to the franchise, to
encourage patronage to member franchisees.204 When considered in
conjunction with the surrounding facts, the court’s language requires
that the instrument which injures a plaintiff must be part of the holding
out by the franchisor upon which the plaintiff relied.205 In many cases,
this requirement is inherently fulfilled, as in the case Miller v. McDonald’s
Corp.
In Miller, the plaintiff was injured from biting into a sapphire that
was inside her sandwich.206 In finding a perceived agency relationship,
the court recognized that McDonald’s use of uniform menus, food
production methods, and service standards, constituted a holding out of
the franchisee as McDonald’s agent.207 While not discussed in the case, it
is self-evident that the instrumentality which caused plaintiff’s injury,
the food, was part and parcel of the representations made by the
franchisor and relied upon by the plaintiff.208 It may be, as King
suggests, that requiring a close fit between the instrumentality of injury
and the manifestations by the principal would fulfill a detrimental
reliance requirement in cases where the plaintiff is injured by an
See King, supra note 161, at 445-46.
See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
203
Id. at 392.
204
Although the court makes no finding as to this point, it seems unlikely that Little
would have chosen to eat at the Howard Johnson restaurant because she expected that
restaurants in Howard Johnson hotels are more or less likely to have their sidewalks
properly cleared.
205
See King, supra note 161, at 452 (stating “one relying on apparent agency should
similarly have to prove justifiable reliance not merely on a manifestation of agency, but
agency with respect to, again, the specific injurious instrument or conduct responsible for
the harm in question”).
206
Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
207
Id. at 1113.
208
See generally King, supra note 161, at 452 (arguing that courts should require a
plaintiff’s reliance to be tied to a belief that the franchisor had control of the instrumentality
that caused the injury but failing to distinguish how doing so would fulfill a detrimental
reliance or change of position requirement).
201
202
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instrumentality that is not part of the principal’s manifestation.
However, in cases like Miller, findings that the plaintiff was injured by
an instrumentality which was part of the principal’s manifestations fail
to bring a court any closer to determining whether the plaintiff has
detrimentally relied.209 Therefore, combining those two concepts runs
the risk of further muddling an already cloudy area of agency law.210
Beyond Miller and Little, courts from a wide range of jurisdictions
have explicitly stated that the only reliance required to hold a franchisor
liable for the acts of a franchisee is justifiable reliance.211 In doing so,
courts have equated enticement with reliance and found franchisors
liable based solely on the plaintiff’s testimony that they chose to do
business with the franchisee because they thought they were dealing
with the franchisor.212 However, noticeably lacking in all of the

See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
But see King, supra note 161, at 445-46 (discussing Little v. Howard Johnson Co. and
contending that the case requires detrimental reliance change of position).
211
See generally McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d at 1113; Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391
A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978); Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308, 309 (3d Cir. 1971).
212
Billops, 391 A.2d at 199.
Plaintiffs have presented evidence of their reliance on Hilton as a
“quality enterprise”. Depositions of several of the plaintiffs produced
the following testimony: By Mr. Billops: “. . . we did go to the Hilton
Hotel for the evening and the people paid $10.00 for the event and not
this shabby treatment . . .” By Mr. Naylor: “We received letters from
the Hilton, signed by Parker [the banquet director] that they were
happy that we had picked their hotel to have our affair in. And we
said now we have got a first class hotel with a first class affair. That is
why we charged $10.00 in advance.. . . that night the treatment of
Parker and the attitude of the personnel at that point, it so alarmed me
that it broke my heart because I put a lot of faith and trust into the
Hilton, because it was a major hotel . . . .” These are statements of
express reliance on the Hilton name, and the quality it represents.
Id.; see also Crinkley, 844 F.2d at 167.
As to the reliance prong of the test, Sarah Crinkley testified that she
and her husband had previously stayed at Holiday Inns and that she
was familiar with its national advertising. She also testified that they
originally attempted to make reservations at a Holiday Inn in
Charlotte because they thought it would be a good place to stay.
Rather than looking for another Charlotte area hotel when they could
not get a room at the Holiday Inn near their destination, they used a
Holiday Inn directory to find another convenient motel. James
Crinkley testified that he did not know the difference between a
franchise inn and a company owned inn at the time . . . and noted that
he would be greatly surprised to find out that Holiday Inns was not
involved in the operation of the Holiday Inn-Concord beyond the
franchise agreement. While the Crinkleys’ evidence of actual reliance
209
210
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franchisor-franchisee cases is any evidence that the plaintiffs have given
up an alternative opportunity they would have taken had they known
the business was not run by the franchisor. Further, without such
evidence, it is unclear how a plaintiff can claim that he was injured by
the franchisor’s representations. Given this understanding of how courts
have applied the doctrines of perceived agency and agency by estoppel
under the Restatement Second, courts will be faced with the decision of
which doctrine to use under the Restatement Third.213
B. Restatement Third: Attempting to Streamline the Law
As previously discussed, the Restatement Third contains similar
language to the Restatement Second in the areas of perceived agency and
agency by estoppel.214 As a result, courts in jurisdictions where the
Restatement Third is adopted will have a choice of which doctrine to use
when faced with agency cases involving employer-employee and
franchisor-franchisee relationships.
1.

Employer-Employee Relationship Under Restatement Third section
7.07

Because Restatement Third, section 7.07 Comment f retains much of
the same language as Restatement Second, section 267, courts in
jurisdictions where the Restatement Third has been adopted can use
section 7.07 and apply the same analysis as courts did under the
Restatement Second.215 In fact, the Restatement Third’s change of language,
if anything, makes it more explicit that section 7.07 Comment f is meant
to be used in the employer-employee context.216 Therefore, in applying it
to the facts in the various hospital contexts, the court would conduct the
same analysis as under the Restatement Second.217
Under this analysis, the first question would be, did the principal
hold out the agent as its employee?218 Secondly, did the plaintiff rely on
may be marginal, we think it sufficed under the applicable substantive
principles to raise a jury issue.
Crinkley, 844 F.2d at 167.
213
See infra Part III.B.
214
See supra Parts II.A.2 (perceived agency), II.C.1 (agency by estoppel).
215
See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (discussing the language change from
Restatement Second § 267 to Restatement Third §7.07 Comment f).
216
See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (explaining the change in language from
master-servant to employer-employee in Restatement Third Section 7.07 Comment f).
217
See supra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
218
See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing the holding out requirement
for perceived agency as applied in Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc.).
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the holding out of the principal?219 Finally, was the plaintiff’s reliance
reasonable and justifiable?220 If the answer is “yes” to all three questions,
then the principal is liable, but, if the answer is “no” to any of these
factors, the principal is not liable.221
Yet, while the change in language from section 267 to the language
of section 7.07 is insignificant in dealing with employer-employee
relationships, it is significant in the context of franchisor-franchisee
relationships.222
2.

Franchisor-Franchisee Relationships Under Restatement Third section
7.07 Comment f

Courts routinely relied on the Restatement Second section 267 to
impose liability upon franchisors for the misdeeds of their franchisees.223
However, while the franchisor-franchisee relationship certainly fits
within the language of section 267 as a master-servant relationship,
section 7.07 Comment f’s use of employer-employee language may
become a pitfall for unsuspecting practitioners. In order to fall within
the reach of section 7.07 Comment f, an attorney will have to give an
employer-employee basis for asserting vicarious liability.224 Because
franchisees are not generally considered employees of franchisors,
practitioners will have to draw their complaints carefully, asserting that
the tortious acts of the franchisee employee should be imputed to the
franchisor, because the franchisor held out all employees of the
franchisee as employees of the franchisor.225
Applying this idea to the facts of Miller v. McDonald’s, the plaintiff
would have to draw her complaint carefully, asserting that McDonald’s
Corporation held out all workers at McDonald’s restaurants as being
employed by McDonald’s Corporation; and, as such, McDonald’s
Corporation should be vicariously liable for the acts of all McDonald’s
employees. Once that is established, the court could use the same
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (discussing the reliance requirement for
perceived agency as applied in Miller v. McDonald’s Corporation).
221
See supra Part II.A.2.
222
See supra Part II.A.2; see also, Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Or. Ct.
App. 1997). “The relationship between two business entities is not precisely an
employment relationship.” Id.
223
See supra Part II.A.2 (demonstrating how courts have used perceived agency to apply
liability to restaurant and hotel franchisors).
224
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006).
225
See supra note 223.
219
220
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analysis as it would under Restatement Second section 267 to impute
liability upon the franchisor.226 Conversely, some courts may be
unwilling to extend the language of section 7.07 Comment f to
franchisor-franchisee relationships, in which case the court may look to
section 2.05 to decide franchisor liability.
3.

Franchisor-Franchisee Relationships Under Restatement Third Section
2.05

Section 8b of the Restatement Second is embodied in section 2.05 of the
Restatement Third.227 Although the language of section 2.05 looks as if it
contains an internal inconsistency, it appears to operate in the same
manner as section 8b.228 Therefore, courts applying section 2.05 in either
the employer-employee or the franchisor-franchisee relationship should
require evidence that the principal caused the third party to believe the
other was his agent and that the third party justifiably and detrimentally
changed position as a result of the belief.229 Applying the doctrine of
agency by estoppel in both the employer-employee and franchisorfranchisee relationship would be a departure from precedent for most
jurisdictions.230 However, the shift from perceived agency to agency by
estoppel would prevent some of the abuse caused by plaintiffs seeking
“deep pockets” to sue.231

226
See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text (describing the courts analysis to find a
holding out by the defendant and justifiable reliance by the plaintiff).
227
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY parallel tbls. at 482.
228
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 begins with the opening clause:
A person who has not made a manifestation that an actor has authority
as an agent and who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction
purportedly done by the actor on that person’s account is subject to
liability to a third party who justifiably is induced to make a
detrimental change in position because the transaction is believed to be
on the person’s account, if
(1) the person intentionally or carelessly caused such belief. . .
Id. The phrase “[a] person who has not made a manifestation that an actor has authority as
an agent” is new to the Restatement’s section on estoppel. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 8b (1958). However, Section 2.05 (1) says the principle will be liable if the
principal causes a belief in the third party that another is his agent. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2.05. Therefore, in order for Section 2.05 to apply, the principal
must not make a manifestation that a person is an agent, but has to intentionally cause the
third party to believe the agent has authority. This inconsistence becomes irreconcilable
when examined in light of the Restatement Third’s expansive view of manifestation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03.
229
See supra Part II.C.1.
230
See supra Parts II.A.2, II.C.1.
231
Dilemma, supra note 193, at 192-94 (discussing the reasons asserted for expanding and
limiting franchisor liability); King, supra note 161, at 465-84 (stating and discussing
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As previously discussed, the difference between perceived agency
and agency by estoppel is the level of reliance required by each of the
doctrines. Of all the cases examined in this Note, only Gasbarra stated
that it required agency by estoppel’s detrimental reliance/change of
position and went on to apply that standard to the facts.232 In all the
other cases, the record is generally lacking of any evidence that the
plaintiffs changed position based on the appearance of an agency
relationship.233
In Miller v. McDonald, there was evidence that the plaintiff had
patronized the McDonald’s restaurant in reliance on a reasonable
expectation about the quality of service at McDonald’s generally.234
However, there is no evidence that she would have chosen not to
patronize the restaurant were she aware that McDonald’s Corp. was not
the owner. This lack of evidence of a true change of position would
preclude a plaintiff from recovering from the defendant franchisor under
the doctrine of agency by estoppel. Similarly, while the plaintiff in Gizzi
v. Texaco, Inc. justifiably relied on the manifestations by Texaco that they
owned the station where he bought his car, there is no evidence that the
plaintiff would have chosen not to buy the car had he known the station
was owned by someone other than Texaco.235
Overall, courts’ adoption of perceived agency in both the employeremployee and franchisor-franchisee relationships has allowed more
plaintiffs to recover from the perceived principal than would have under
the doctrine of agency by estoppel.236 Further, while there are justifiable
concerns about leaving a plaintiff without a remedy, courts should be
wary of being too lenient in allowing plaintiffs to recover without

“Consistency and Predictability,” “Modern Irrelevance of the Historical Underpinnings of
Vicarious Liability,” “Dilemmas of Franchisors,” “Loss Prevention, Risk Reduction, and
Incentives,” “Loss Spreading,” “Loss Allocation,” “Corrective Justice,” “Deep Pocket
[Hunting],” “Administrative Costs,” “Fairness,” and “Autonomy and Freedom of
Enterprise and to Contract” as reasons for limiting franchisor liability) (alteration in the
original).
232
See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
233
See supra notes 32, 41 and accompanying text (discussing the cases Miller v.
McDonald’s Corporation, Crinkley v. Holiday Inns Inc., Gizzi v. Texaco Inc. and Billops v.
Magness Constr. Co.).
234
Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
235
Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 1971) (recounting Gizzi’s testimony
“[a]ppellant Gizzi testified that he was aware of the advertising engaged in by Texaco and
that it had instilled in him a certain sense of confidence in the corporation and its
products.”).
236
See supra Part III.
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establishing that they were injured by conduct of the “principal.”237 By
not requiring detrimental reliance/change of position, courts allow
plaintiffs to recover for conduct that they would have undertaken
regardless of the manifestations by the “principal.” Therefore, the best
way to promote the advantages that result when entities are allowed to
work together, while protecting the consuming public, is to require
plaintiffs to show detrimental reliance or change of position when
asserting a claim under perceived agency and agency by estoppel.
IV. CONTRIBUTION
As discussed in Part II, courts have been inconsistent and confusing
in applying the doctrines of perceived agency, agency by estoppel, and
apparent authority.238 Due to the fact that courts consistently fail to
differentiate between the doctrines, the law could be clarified by
eliminating one or more of them. The question becomes, which doctrine
should be eliminated?
Apparent authority should remain in tact because it applies to a
vastly different situation than the other two doctrines.239 Therefore the
courts’ interpretation aside, apparent authority is an independently
important doctrine that serves an indispensable role in agency law. On
the other hand, perceived agency and agency by estoppel cover roughly
the same situation in agency law, and operate in the same way except for
one respect.240 Furthermore, as discussed in Part III, the doctrine of
agency by estoppel protects franchisors and employers by requiring the
plaintiff to show reliance and a change position, typically forgoing the
choice of the defendant’s competitor if they had known an agency
relationship did not exist.241 Consequently, this Note suggests removing
the perceived agency language from the Restatement Third section 7.07
Comment f and expanding section 2.05 in order for agency by estoppel

Dilemma, supra note 193, at 193.
See supra Parts II.A.2 (perceived agency), II.C.1 (agency by estoppel), II.B.2 (apparent
authority).
239
See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing that apparent authority only applies after an agency
relationship has been established whereas the other two doctrines impose an agency
relationship where one did not exist).
240
Compare Parts II.A.2 (discussing how perceived agency is used to confer liability in the
absence of an agency relationship where a third party has justifiably relied on the
appearance of an agency relationship), with Part II.C. (discussing how agency by estoppel
has been used to confer liability in the absence of an agency relationship where a third
party has justifiably relied on the appearance of an agency relationship and detrimentally
changed position based on that reliance).
241
See supra Part III.
237
238
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to cover the situations which were previously addressed in the
Restatement Second section 267.242 These changes will streamline the law
and help guide courts in applying agency by estoppel.
A. Proposed Amendment to Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 Comment f
243

f. Definition of employee. For purposes of respondeat
superior, an agent is an employee only when the
principal controls or has the right to control the manner
and means through which the agent performs work.
The definition has the consequence of distinguishing
between employees and agents who are not employees
because they retain the right to control how they
perform their work. If a person has no right to control
an actor and exercises no control over the actor, the actor
is not an agent. See § 1.01, Comment f(1).
The fact that an agent performs work gratuitously
does not relieve a principal of vicarious liability when
the principal controls or has the right to control the
manner and means of the agent’s performance of work.
A person who causes a third party to believe that an
actor is the person’s employee may be subject to liability
to the third party for harm caused by the actor when the
third party justifiably relies on the actor’s skill or care
and the actor’s conduct, if that of an employee, would be
within the scope of employment. For the general
principle of estoppel, see § 2.05.
B. Commentary
This revision completely eliminates the Restatement Second’s section
267 language from the Restatement Third.244 The elimination of perceived
agency from the Restatement Third will have three main effects.245
First, eliminating this language will force courts to apply Restatement
Third section 2.05 in cases where the plaintiff claims a principal is liable

See infra Part IV.
The proposals are the contribution of the author. Specifically, the proposed deletions
are struck out.
244
See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatement Third’s
change of the perceived agency language and its possible impacts).
245
See infra note 247.
242
243
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even though no agency relationship exists.246 Currently, the only ways
to bind a principal when the requirements for an actual agency do not
exist, as a matter of law, are to use perceived agency or agency by
estoppel.247 The elimination of perceived agency forces courts, which
choose to adopt the Restatement Third, to use agency by estoppel.
Secondly, this change would result in the creation of a uniform
standard for imparting liability upon a principal despite the absence of
an agency relationship.248 As previously discussed, a court’s choice to
apply either the Restatement Second section 8b or 267 changes the
required level of reliance.249 Unlike perceived agency, agency by
estoppel, as embodied in Restatement Third section 2.05, has a clearly
articulated reliance standard—change of position, along with
explanation of what fulfills that standard.250 Therefore, by eliminating
perceived agency from the Restatement Third and promoting the use of
agency by estoppel, courts will have clearer guidance for what level of
reliance is required.251

Compare Part II.A.2, with Part II.C.1.
See supra Parts II.A, II.C.
248
See infra notes 250-51.
249
See supra Part III.A (examining how under the Restatement Second § 267 justifiable
reliance is required; however, under the Restatement Second Section 8b Detrimental Reliance
is required).
250
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (2006):
§ 2.05 Estoppel To Deny Existence Of Agency Relationship
A person who has not made a manifestation that an actor has authority
as an agent and who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction
purportedly done by the actor on that person’s account is subject to
liability to a third party who justifiably is induced to make a
detrimental change in position because the transaction is believed to be
on the person’s account, if
(1) the person intentionally or carelessly caused such belief,
or
(2) having notice of such belief and that it might induce
others to change their positions, the person did not take
reasonable steps to notify them of the facts. . . .
b. Terminology. The doctrine in this section encompasses definitions of
“ostensible authority” that hold a principal accountable for an
appearance of authority arising solely from the principal’s failure to
use ordinary care. Some statutes and cases so define “ostensible
authority,” while others use it as a synonym for “apparent authority”
as defined in § 2.03. “Detrimental change of position” means an
expenditure of money or labor, an incurrence of a loss, or subjection to legal
liability, not the loss of the benefit of a bargain.
Id. (emphasis added).
251
See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
246
247
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The third effect of eliminating the perceived agency language from
section 7.07 is to move the issue of holding individuals liable for the acts
of another who is not his agent to the forefront of the Restatement. It
appears that the drafters of the Restatement Third were making a
concerted effort to consolidate sections of the Restatement Second.252 In
fact, section 7.07 incorporates all or part of thirty different sections from
the Restatement Second.253 Undoubtedly, when trying to combine so
many sections, priorities have to be set and certain concepts take a back
seat to others. In the Restatement Third, perceived agency suffers that fate
by being buried in Comment f of a section concerned with determining
whether or not a person is acting within his scope of employment.254
This is not to say that questions about scope of employment and
perceived agency are not related. However, as previously discussed,
perceived agency has been used in contexts beyond the traditional scope
of employment inquiries.255 Furthermore, including the doctrine of
perceived agency within the Restatement Third’s section on scope of
employment makes little sense considering the questions each
methodology tries to answer.
The purpose of section 7.07 is to define when an employer is liable
for the tortious acts of an employee.256 In order to fulfill this purpose,
section 7.07 presupposes an employment relationship because, without
one, there is no scope of employment. However, this underlying
assumption is what makes including the perceived agency language in
section 7.07 problematic. The doctrine of perceived agency is a question
of liability where no actual agency exists, but the purpose of section 7.07
is to answer a question that presumes an agency relationship. Because
section 7.07 and the doctrine of perceived agency are attempting to
answer greatly different questions, they are at odds with one another.
However, eliminating the doctrine of perceived agency from the
Restatement Third is not the only change that must be made in order to
maintain continuity within the law of agency and specifically answer the
question of when to hold people responsible for the acts of non-agents.

252
253
254
255
256

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY parallel tbls.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07.
See supra Part III.A.2.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/10

Wade: The Double Doctrine Agent: Streamlining the Restatement (Third) o

2007]

The Double Doctrine Agent

381

C. Proposed Amendment to Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.05 257
§ 2.05 Estoppel
Relationship

To

Deny

Existence

Of

Agency

A person who has not made a manifestation that an
actor has authority as an agent and who is not otherwise
liable as a party to a transaction purportedly done by the
actor on that person’s account is subject to liability to a
third party who justifiably is induced to make a
detrimental change in position because the transaction is
believed to be on the person’s account, if
(1) the person, through manifestations to the third party,
intentionally caused such belief, or
(2) the person, through lack of due care, carelessly
caused such belief, or
(2)(3) having notice of such belief and that it might
induce others to change their positions, the person did
not take reasonable steps to notify them of the facts.
Comment: . . .
c. In general. The estoppel stated in this section
protects third parties who justifiably rely on a belief that
an actor is an agent and who act on that belief to their
detriment. The doctrine is applicable when the person
against whom estoppel is asserted has made no
manifestation that an actor has authority as an agent but
because of manifestations or a lack of due care by the person is
responsible for the third party’s belief that an actor is an
agent and the third party has justifiably been induced by
that belief to undergo a detrimental change in position.
Most often Many times the person estopped will be
responsible for the third party’s erroneous belief as the
consequence of a failure to use reasonable care, either to
prevent circumstances that foreseeably led to the belief,
or to correct the belief once on notice of it. . . .
d. Rationale. . . .Estoppel In cases where the third
party’s belief is caused by a lack of due care estoppel is
analyzed with doctrinal elements similar to those

The proposals are the contribution of the author. Specifically, the proposed insertions
are in italics and the deletions are struck out.
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applicable to a claim of negligent misrepresentation. See
Restatement Second, Torts § 552. . . .
Illustrations.
1. Hospital H hires an independent firm F to manage
the emergency room personnel. All doctors that work in the
emergency room are independent contractors and not
employees of H. T brings her daughter to the emergency room
for care. B, an emergency room doctor, treats the girl
negligently. Had T known the doctors in the emergency room
were not employees of H she would have taken her daughter to
another hospital. If it is found that H had notice that
individuals using the emergency room believed the doctors
were employees of H and H failed to correct those beliefs, H
could be liable despite a lack of an agency relationship.
2. Same facts as 1, except that T would have used the
emergency room no matter who the emergency room doctors
worked for. H is not liable because T has not detrimentally
changed position.
3. Franchisor M engages in a national advertising
campaign to promote patronage to its franchisee’s restaurant.
M does not retain control over its franchisees although it
offers suggestions and tips on how its franchisees may
improve its business. Further, although M does not own the
franchisee restaurants it does not require franchisee to notify
customers in any way that the restaurant is not owned by M.
Customer C, relying on a perceived uniformity of service and
products at M restaurants, dines at a M restaurant which is
franchised to K. C is burned by negligently produced coffee.
C would not have dined at the restaurant if he had known it
was not owned by M. M is liable because it held out to the
public that M restaurants were a commonly owned enterprise
and carelessly caused the belief that all M restaurants were
owned by Franchisor M.
4. Same facts as 3, except that M requires
franchisees to prominently display signs that state
restaurant is not owned by Franchisor M. M is likely
liable because they have placed C on notice that they are
the principal of K.
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5. Same facts as 3, except that C would have eaten at
the M restaurant even if he had known that it was actually
owned by K. M is not liable since C did not detrimentally rely
on M’s holding out.
D. Commentary
These revisions expand the scope and discussion of estoppel within
the Restatement Third. In designing section 2.05, the drafters were guided
by two principals. First, anytime estoppel and another section of the
Restatement are applicable, estoppel is submissive and the other section
is controlling.258 Second, given estoppel’s submissive role in the
Restatement Third, section 2.05 was drafted narrowly to avoid as much
overlap with other sections as possible. As a result, section 2.05 and its
illustrations are focused on situations where the principal has
negligently caused the belief or negligently failed to correct a belief.259
However, if perceived agency was eliminated from the Restatement Third
it would be necessary to expand the language of section 2.05 to include
situations traditionally thought to fall under the doctrine of perceived
agency.
The above revisions to section 2.05 expand the doctrine of agency by
estoppel. The two illustrations are based on actual cases.260 The first
illustration is based on Gasbarra v. St. James Hospital261 and the second is
based on Miller v. McDonald’s Corp.262 Gasbarra and McDonald’s Corp.
represent the two contexts in which perceived agency and/or agency by
estoppel are most often used: employer-employee and franchisorfranchisee. These revisions will help courts accurately apply agency by
estoppel in the future and allow the doctrine to fill the void in agency
law created by removing perceived agency from the Restatement Third.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the doctrines of perceived agency and agency by estoppel
operate in substantially the same manner, they differ in the level of
reliance required to apply them. The law of agency could operate with
only one of the doctrines, as they both apply to situations where a
principal is somehow responsible for the beliefs of an innocent third
See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (stating that estoppel is a subservient
doctrine to the other sections of the Restatement Third).
259
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05.
260
See infra notes 262-63.
261
See generally Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 406 N.E.2d 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
262
See generally Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
258

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 10

384

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

party. As such, the doctrine of perceived agency should be eliminated
from the Restatement Third and an expansive view of agency by estoppel
should be adopted. Estoppel’s clear requirement of detrimental reliance
will aid courts that try to apply the doctrine and prevent plaintiffs from
recovering for actions they would have taken regardless of the
principal’s manifestations or negligence. Furthermore, because estoppel
is an equitable doctrine, courts may consider fairness to all parties in
deciding whether to impose liability rather than following a formalistic
rule that mandates liability if certain conditions are met. This freedom
would allow courts to punish the most egregious defendants for their
misrepresentations while giving businesses permission to experiment
with different and new forms of business organizations which may have
unforeseen consequences on their agency relationships.
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